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Abstract 
This article presents an argument for the view that we can perceive temporal 
features without awareness. Evidence for this claim comes from recent 
empirical work on selective visual attention. An interpretation of selective 
attention as a mechanism that processes high-level perceptual features is 
offered and defended against one particular objection. In conclusion, time 
perception likely has an unconscious dimension and temporal mental 
qualities can be instantiated without ever being conscious. 
Keywords: time perception; conscious experience of time; N2pc; perception 
without awareness; mental qualities. 
1. Mental qualities and consciousness 
Properties responsible for the qualitative character of conscious experience 
are typically referred to as qualia, hereinafter referred to as mental qualities. 
Some examples of mental qualities are the sweet-sour taste of an orange or 
the sharp pain of a pinprick. It seems easy to understand what we are talking 
about when we refer to the taste of an orange or the pain of a pinprick, but it 
is not easy to give a theoretical account of mental qualities. 
There is a rich literature on mental qualities in philosophy that represents 
several competing theories about them. However, for all this diversity, there 
are arguably only two approaches to understanding the nature of mental 
qualities (Rosenthal 2010). One approach identifies mental qualities with the 
qualitative character of conscious experiences, e.g., the qualitative taste of an 
orange is whatever it is like to experience the taste an orange consciously. The 
other approach characterizes mental qualities functionally, relying on the 
perceptual role they play in the mental economy of an organism, e.g., the 
qualitative taste of an orange is whatever mental property gives an organism 
the ability to discriminate it from other tastes.  
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The consciousness-based approach is committed to the view that we know 
about mental qualities by accessing them through consciousness. For exam-
ple, we identify pains only by way of consciousness (Kripke 1980, p. 149, Put-
nam 1967). This way of individuating pains from non-pains builds conscious-
ness in, so consciousness is understood to be an intrinsic property of men-
tal qualities. 
On the other hand, according to the perceptual-role approach, individual 
mental qualities are characterized in terms of the relations they bear to other 
mental qualities in the same family. For example, the taste of an orange is the 
mental quality that is closer (whatever that means in the context of a particu-
lar perceptual-role theory) to the taste of a lemon than to the taste of an avo-
cado in the family of mental qualities of taste. Perceptual-role theories typical-
ly characterize these relations functionally at the expense of relying on sub-
jective qualitative character (Rosenthal 1991, Clark 1993). They can do this by, 
for example, a metric that uses the number of just noticeable differences be-
tween individual tastes or colors and then specifies a space of relations using 
that metric (Clark 1993). 
Importantly, perceptual-role theories are not committed to the view that men-
tal qualities always occur consciously, because they do not individuate them 
by the way they appear subjectively, as is the case with consciousness-based 
views. According to the perceptual-role approach, the relations that individu-
ate a particular mental quality might be—but not need be—related to con-
sciousness. Of course, this does not mean that they cannot be so connected, 
but whether they are or not remains an empirical question.  
These two approaches—consciousness-based and perceptual-role—can also be 
adopted in the temporal domain of perceptual experience. On one hand, one 
could adopt the view that temporal mental qualities (TMQs) such as duration 
or timing are intrinsically conscious and are individuated by their subjective 
character. On the other hand, one could adopt the view that TMQs are contin-
gently conscious and individuated functionally. 
For a theorist that adopts a consciousness-based approach, the following claim 
is not only plausible, but a straightforward consequence of the more general 
thesis about the nature of mental qualities:  
(T) If mental state S features TMQs, then S is conscious. 
Recall that with the consciousness-based approach, if mental state S features 
any mental qualities, then S is conscious. Therefore, we would need inde-
pendent reasons to think that this more general claim does not apply to TMQs 
in particular.  
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Edmund Husserl endorsed (T) when he argued that the temporality of con-
sciousness has a protention/primal impression/retention structure (Husserl 
1991). If this is right, then every conscious experience has the aforementioned 
structure. Temporality, therefore, is a structural property of consciousness. 
One popular interpretation of Husserl’s view states that temporality is not 
only necessary for self-awareness, but is perhaps even constitutive of it (Za-
havi 2003, p. 164-70).  
A theorist that takes the perceptual-role approach does not have to accept (T). 
They can stand by a weaker claim, such as: if mental state S features TMQs, 
then S may be conscious. Alternatively, if a mental state S features TMQs, then 
S is conscious if condition C obtains, where C is some psychological or neural 
state responsible for conscious experience. Again, for the perceptual-role the-
orist, whether either of these formulations or some other is true remains an 
empirical question. 
The goal of this paper is to weaken the consciousness-based claim (T). In the 
following section, I argue that the perceptual-role approach fits better with 
neuroscientific findings. To that end, I will review some recent experimental 
work that strongly suggests the existence of a perceptually encoded temporal 
structure that is used by selective visual attention. In the third section, I con-
sider and dismiss on empirical grounds an objection that disputes my inter-
pretation of empirical work cited in the following section. 
 
2. Conscious and unconscious temporal structure 
Below I focus on a recent electroencephalography (EEG) study of visual search 
that measured the N2pc component of an event-related evoked potential 
(Eimer and Grubert 2014). EEG records electrical potentials using electrodes 
placed at various sites on the scalp during stimulus presentations. The tem-
poral and spatial profile of the recorded potentials can be used to individuate 
the neural correlates of functionally individuated psychological processes. For 
example, the so-called P300 component is an increase in voltage recorded ap-
proximately 300 milliseconds after the onset of a perceived visual stimulus in 
electrodes over the parietal lobe and is typically thought to reflect activation 
of the neural correlate of object identification and/or conscious experience. 
The N2pc component is an electrical negativity that emerges approximately 
200 milliseconds after the onset of a stimulus contralaterally to the location of 
a target stimulus on posterior (occipito-temporal) scalp sites (Luck and 
Hillyard 1994). Therefore, if a perceiver is asked to visually search for a target 
object on the left side of their visual field, the N2pc component is likely to oc-
cur on the right side of the posterior part of their scalp. N2pc is typically in-
terpreted as a reflection of attentional selection of a visual target during 
search in the corresponding part of the visual field (Eimer 1996).  
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In Eimer and Grubert’s 2014 EEG study, participants were presented with two 
displays in distinct blocks in which the displays were 100, 50, 20, or 10 milli-
seconds apart. These displays contained one alphanumerical color-defined 
target and one alphanumerical distractor. One target-distractor pair was 
aligned horizontally and the other pair was aligned vertically, with random-
ized order of alignment. After the displays were presented, participants were 
asked to indicate with button presses whether the color-defined targets across 
the two displays belonged to the same alphanumerical category or not. For 
example, participants pressed one button if the first display featured a red 
letter and the second display featured a red number. They pressed the other 
button if both displays featured a blue letter. 
The onset of the N2pc component matched the objective time course of the 
presentations on the computer monitor almost exactly in all the experimental 
blocks (100, 50, 20, and 10 milliseconds delay between two displays). In other 
words, the temporal structure of the presentations was encoded and pro-
cessed by selective attention with a temporal resolution of up to 10 millisec-
onds. This is striking, because the temporal resolution of conscious visual ex-
perience, as measured by temporal order judgments,1 is approximately 30 
milliseconds (Pöppel 1997, VanRullen, Zoefel, and Ilhan 2014). 
Eimer and Grubert's 2014 study shows that selective visual attention can be 
allocated to onset items at a rate of one per 10 milliseconds.2 For example, say 
we are looking at a two lights, A and B, which are each turning on and off 100 
times a second alternatingly. Every 10 milliseconds one light turns on and the 
other light turns off. Given the temporal resolution of consciousness, in this 
scenario A and B will appear to be constantly on. Nonetheless, selective atten-
tion can switch each time one of the lights comes on. This is because, as the 
aforementioned experiment demonstrates, selective attention can distinguish 
onsets at a rate of one every 10 milliseconds.  
Selective attention involves visual search and there is no visual search in the 
aforementioned example with two lights. Therefore, the example involves an 
intentional simplification. The admittedly idealized scenario is meant to em-
phasize that the temporal resolution of consciousness is not as high as the 
temporal resolution of selective attention: 
 
                                                             
1 Participants make temporal order judgments when they are asked to indicate which of two 
successive stimuli came after the other. When participants are at chance in their temporal order 
judgments, it is assumed that they perceive the two successive stimuli as one. 
2 I am very grateful to the authors of this study for stressing to me the importance of it being 
merely onsets, and not both onsets and offsets to which selective attention is allocated.  
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Figure 1. Conscious experience of two lights switching on and off every 10 millisec-
onds. The plus (+) sign indicates the light being on and the minus sign (-) indicates the 
light being off. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how conscious visual experience can present us with two 
continuous lights, while selective attention switches between them turning on 
and off. The implications of this finding extend beyond the temporal resolu-
tion of perceptual mechanisms. Most importantly, it sheds light on the rela-
tionship between perceptually represented temporal structure and conscious 
experience of that structure, both of which are sometimes thought to be inex-
tricably linked, especially if one accepts (T).  
I use the notion of temporal structure to refer to the sum of event boundaries, 
durations, and the relations between them. The beginning (onset) and end 
(offset) of a perceivable event flank its duration. Some events happen before 
others, while some events last longer than others. All of these onsets, offsets, 
durations, and relations together constitute the temporal structure of the per-
ceivable world. To be successful in a dynamic environment, organisms need 
to be able to perceive the temporal structure of that environment relatively 
well.  
As numerous studies of time perception demonstrate, the temporal structure 
of the perceivable environment is not always accurately reflected in human 
perception (for a review see Grondin, 2010). Certain emotions, for example, 
make the durations of perceived stimuli appear longer or shorter than they 
really are (Droit-Volet and Meck 2007) and sounds appear to last longer than 
lights of equal duration (Wearden 1998). Oddball visual stimuli presented in 
the middle of a stream of identical visual stimuli appear longer than they ac-
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tually are (Tse et al. 2004). Therefore, there can be a mismatch between the 
way that parts of the perceivable temporal structure of the world (individual 
onsets, offsets, durations, etc.) are related to each other and the way they are 
perceived to be related.  
Eimer and Grubert’s 2014 EEG study demonstrates that the temporal resolu-
tion of the mechanisms of selective visual attention is close to three times that 
of conscious visual experience. Eimer and Grubert's 2015 behavioral study 
corroborates this conclusion (Eimer and Grubert 2015). In their study, each 
participant was presented with two displays of one colored uppercase letter 
or colored number for 20 milliseconds and asked to report whether the target 
in the first display was a letter or a number by pressing one of two buttons. 
This indirectly measured the participants' ability to make temporal order 
judgments about the two displays, because in order to make that identifica-
tion, participants had to be able to tell which was first.  
The first manipulation was in the stimulus onset asynchrony between the two 
displays, which was either 10, 20, or 30 milliseconds. The second manipulation 
was a change in color: on some trials, the color of the target in each display 
was the same, while in others it was different. Participants saw a letter or 
number colored red, green, blue, or yellow for 20 milliseconds and then a col-
ored letter or number, either in the same color or some other color, either 10, 
20, or 20 milliseconds later, and then had to report on the category of the tar-
get in the first display.  
Results of the aforementioned experiment show that when the displays were 
separated by 10 milliseconds, participants were at chance in determining the 
category of the first display. This suggests that they were not able to make 
explicit temporal order judgments when the two displays were presented at a 
rate beyond the rate at which their selective attention is able to make distinct 
temporal orderings. This compliments Gruber and Eimer's 2014 EEG study, 
which shows that selective visual attention can discriminate visual stimuli 10 
milliseconds apart.  
This sort of evidence demonstrates that, on average, selective visual attention 
can be sensitive to more of the relations between the parts of the perceivable 
temporal structure of the world than can conscious visual experience. As Fig-
ure 1 illustrates, the onsets and durations of lights A and B are detected by 
selective attention and never feature in conscious experience. Therefore, 
there are relations between onsets, offsets, and durations in the world that are 
reflected in selective attention, but not in consciousness.3 
Evidence that parts of the perceivable temporal structure are perceptually 
encoded without consciousness can be used as an argument against a con-
                                                             
3 A similar argument based on results of a functional magnetic resonance imagining study of 
event boundary segmentation in movies is offered in (Klincewicz 2011). 
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sciousness-based interpretation of (T). According to (T), we would expect that 
any part of the perceptually encoded temporal structure is inevitably con-
scious. I have argued that the aforementioned experimental results strongly 
suggest that this cannot be the case.  
A consciousness-based theorist could argue that the EEG evidence presented 
here merely shows a subpersonal or neural mechanism at work, so it does not 
challenge (T). In order to provide more definitive evidence against (T), we 
should have an independent reason to interpret Eimer and Grubert's results 
as telling us something about perceptual states that are taxonomized folk psy-
chologically. This is what the next section aims to do. 
 
3. Resisting a consciousness-based interpretation 
The reasons for thinking that Eimer and Grbert's 2014 and 2015 studies are 
evidence for unconscious perception of temporal structure taxonomized folk 
psychologically are the following: (1) location of the neural correlates of the 
N2pc component in the ventral visual stream, which is known to process visu-
al features, such as color, and is connected to consciousness; (2) the relatively 
late onset of the N2pc component close to the P300 component, which is close-
ly correlated with consciousness; (3) evidence that the N2pc component corre-
lates with the ability to report, which involves processing of high-level percep-
tual features.  
1) The anatomical distribution of the correlates of selective visual attention is 
telling as it strongly suggests that the mechanisms involved are perceptual 
and connected to consciousness. Firstly, recall that the N2pc component con-
nected to selective memory is recorded with EEG from posterior areas of the 
scalp (Luck and Hillyard 1994). These areas of the scalp are directly above the 
visual cortex. Similarly, magnetoencelographic (MEG) recordings indicate that 
the N2pc is generated in areas in the extrastriate occipital-temporal cortex 
(Hopf et al. 2000), which includes area V4, typically associated with color pro-
cessing. Moreover, imaging of blood oxygenation levels in the brain using 
combined functional magnetic resonance/EEG corroborate the cited EEG and 
MEG recordings, again pointing to the same area, V4, as being particularly 
involved in selective memory (Hopf et al. 2006).  
Secondly, the temporal areas of the visual cortex are all a part of the ventral 
visual stream, which is tied to conscious visual experience and is distinct from 
the dorsal visual stream in the parietal areas, which is invariably unconscious, 
fast, and closely related to action (Goodale and Milner 1992). Neurons in the 
ventral stream respond selectively to features, such as color or shape, and 
neurons in the dorsal stream to locations. Availability to consciousness and 
processing of features are hallmarks of high-level perceptual processing.  
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2) The temporal profile of N2pc is also telling because this component occurs 
relatively late (~200 milliseconds) after the target visual stimulus, which 
strongly suggests a substantial amount of prior neural processing. While it 
remains controversial how long it takes a signal to result in a conscious expe-
rience, it has been argued that it could be 240 milliseconds with visual stimuli 
(Koch 2004, p. 240) and up to 500 milliseconds with tactile stimuli (Libet 2004, 
p. 76-8, Libet et al. 1979). Recent EEG studies of the temporal profile of visual 
conscious experience are in line with many previous studies in placing it ear-
lier, namely, at the onset of the P300 component (~220-300 milliseconds after 
target) (Rutiku et al. 2015). 
Therefore, shortly after the onset of N2pc we typically have a corresponding 
conscious visual experience, as reflected in the P300 component. This suggests 
that the final visual percept is ready at the time N2pc occurs right before it is 
consciously accessed at the time P300 occurs. In line with this idea, some re-
cent theoretical work on the synthesis of global workspace theory of con-
sciousness (Baars 2002) and empirical findings in visual attention both explic-
itly place the correlate of N2pc right before availability to conscious access 
(Raffone, Srinivasan, and van Leeuwen 2014, p. 9). This temporal proximity 
further strengthens the view that selective visual attention operates on repre-
sentations that include visual features that can be accessed by consciousness. 
3) Neither of the previous two reasons is likely to convince a consciousness-
based theorist. This is because anatomical and temporal similarities are vul-
nerable to the same objection that they aim to answer: they may reflect sub-
personal neural mechanisms that cannot be taxonimized folk psychologically. 
Given this, perhaps the most important reason to resist the consciousness-
based interpretation has to do with the connection that N2pc has to the ability 
to make verbal reports. This connection suggests that states involved in selec-
tive attention have the same role in identification as their conscious counter-
parts, which constitutes an independent reason to taxonomize them folk psy-
chologically.  
We know that ability to report is closely related to conscious experience. For 
some, verbal reports remain the most common way of operationalizing con-
sciousness in experiments (Seth et al. 2008). This key role for reports arguably 
comes from the observation that in order to report one has to be, in some way, 
aware of what one is reporting and, if the report is verbal, form a judgment 
about it. Conversely, when one is not so aware, one can neither report nor 
form a judgment.  
The same is true of awareness of change: in order to report on the nature of a 
change, one needs to be able to be aware of it and form an appropriate judg-
ment about it. We have evidence that selective attention reflected in the N2pc 
component is closely related to the ability to report an identified change 
(Busch, Fründ, and Herrmann 2010). This suggests involvement of higher-
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cognitive abilities that can access high-level perceptual features in reports of 
change identification.  
As the Busch, Fründ, and Herrmann 2010 study reported, “no change-related 
positivity or N2pc was observed when the change was only detected or when 
observers were change blind” (10). Change detection without change identifi-
cation occurs when one can report that something has changed without being 
able to report on the nature of the change. For example, reporting that some-
thing does not feel the same about the layout of one's bedroom, without being 
able to tell what it is. Change blindness occurs when no report of change can 
be made at all.  
Therefore, Busch, Fründ, and Herrmann 2010 report that—similar to change 
blindness—there was no change-related positivity or N2pc component when 
change was detected, but not identified. When participants could report that 
they merely sensed something change, they could not report on the features of 
the change and no N2pc was detected. This strongly suggests that the N2pc 
component reflects a perceptual mechanism critically tied to how we folk psy-
chologically taxonomize perceptual mental states that may be reported on.  
There is also evidence that N2pc can occur without conscious experience that 
comes from a study of object-substitution masking (Woodman and Luck 2003). 
The Woodman and Luck study demonstrated that an equivalent N2pc compo-
nent was present when the identity of a masked target was detected and in 
trials in which the ability to detect the target was impaired. This suggests that 
masked targets are accurately identified by the perceptual system, but not 
passed on to higher-level cognitive systems where they could be used in a re-
port. These results join a number of others that strongly suggest that selective 
attention/N2pc involves high-level perceptual representations of features that 
may be used in a report on those features.  
While (1)-(3) are not sufficient to resist the consciousness-based interpretation 
definitively, taken together they make a strong case for the view that the N2pc 
component is indeed tracking a high-level perceptual mechanism that we 
should taxonomize folk psychologically. Therefore, it is not likely that the pro-
cesses reflected by the N2pc are merely neural or subpersonal. It is more rea-
sonable to interpret these processes as a psychological state in the relevant 
sense and expect these processes to instantiate TMQs. 
 
In general, it may also be worth noting that it is not as controversial as it used 
to be to think that we can perceive without awareness (Cheesman and Merikle 
1986, Merikle, Smilek, and Eastwood 2001, Prinz 2015). There is now a wealth 
of empirical evidence of perceptually informed performance without aware-
ness: perceptual priming (Marcel 1983), semantic priming (Dehaene et al. 
1998), priming during change-blindness (Fernandez-Duque et al. 2003, Fer-
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nandez-Duque and Thornton 2000), blindsight (Kentridge, Heywood, and 
Weiskrantz 1999, Weiskrantz 1986), relative blindsight induced by meta-
contrast masking (Lau and Passingham 2006), and blindsight induced with 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Ro and Rafal 2006). Given this wealth of 
evidence in other perceptual domains, it would be surprising if perception of 
temporal features could not also occur without awareness. 
Nonetheless, the debate about the existence of unconscious perception is far 
from resolved. Ian Phillips has vigorously argued that none of the empirical 
studies typically brought up as evidence for unconscious perception actually 
support this claim (Phillips 2015). Other interpretations, Phillips argues, are 
more compelling. Given this, the interpretation of the evidence from the stud-
ies of Eimer and Gruber is, to some extent, hostage to a much larger debate in 
philosophy about the nature of consciousness.  
 There also remains the issue of whether the unconscious states putatively 
involved in effects that seem to support unconscious perception, such as those 
I brought forward in this paper, involve mental qualities, even if they are tax-
onomized folk psychologically. Berit Brogaard, for example, argues that clas-
sic cases of blindsight should be interpreted as involving thoughts (Brogaard 
2011). Ned Block would probably also not accept that unconscious perception 
involves qualitative mental properties, even though he argues for the exist-
ence of unconscious perception (Block 2015, 2011). Geoffrey Lee on the other 
hand would likely accept that there is unconscious time perception, but prob-
ably disagree that unconscious time perception involves TMQs (Lee 2014). 
Similar distinctions and considerations may apply to the studies of Eimer and 
Gruber I reported on here, thereby complicating their interpretation and my 
case against (T). 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, I argued that TMQs can occur without awareness. My argument 
depends on an interpretation of a recent EEG study, which demonstrates that 
the temporal resolution of selective visual attention is finer in grain than the 
temporal resolution of conscious visual experience. This strongly suggests that 
selective visual attention regularly uses representations of temporal features 
that never become conscious. The consciousness-based interpretation of (T), 
which is that if a mental state S features TMQs, then it is conscious, is under-
mined. In its place, we should accept a perceptual-role version of (T): if mental 
state S features TMQs, then S may be conscious. Alternatively, if mental state 
features TMQs, then S is conscious if condition C obtains, where C is some psy-
chological or neural state responsible for conscious experience.  
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